Throughout Sudan’s civil conflict, which erupted in April 2023, either side have more and more relied on drones, and civilians have borne the brunt of the carnage.
The battle between the Sudanese armed forces (SAF) and the Fast Help Forces (RSF) paramilitary group is an instance of conflict remodeled by commercially out there, simply concealable unmanned aerial automobiles (UAVs), or drones.
Modular, well-adapted to sanctions evasions and devastatingly efficient, drones have killed scores of civilians, crippled infrastructure and plunged Sudanese cities into darkness.
On this visible investigation, Al Jazeera examines the historical past of drone warfare in Sudan, the varieties of drones utilized by the warring sides, how they’re sourced, the place the assaults have occurred and the human toll.
Janjaweed to RSF: The evolution of warfare
The RSF traces its origins to what on the time was a government-linked militia generally known as the Janjaweed. Sudan’s authorities mobilised it through the Darfur battle within the early 2000s to suppress a rebel within the western area.
The United Nations accused the Janjaweed of conflict crimes and crimes towards humanity for its ways, together with burning villages, mass killings and sexual violence.
In 2013, the Sudanese authorities beneath President Omar al-Bashir, who was overthrown in 2019 after sustained standard protests, formally formalised the Janjaweed militias into the RSF beneath the command of Basic Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo.
In 2015, Sudan joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen to struggle the Houthis, who had seized the capital, Sanaa. Along with common troopers, Sudan despatched 1000’s of RSF fighters, permitting Hemedti to determine direct relationships with leaders in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
To start with, the Janjaweed relied on mild weapons and vans. Then because the RSF, it adopted heavy artillery and ultimately drones, permitting it to strike from a distance.
On April 15, 2023, longstanding tensions between Military Chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF Chief Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo escalated into conflict. This battle was primarily ignited by disagreements relating to the mixing of the RSF into the common military, a key step within the deliberate transition to civilian rule.
The introduction of drones shifted the steadiness of energy away from the Sudanese military, which used to regulate the skies with its fighter jets.
What drones do the SAF and RSF have?
Sudan’s flat terrain and restricted cowl make it well-suited to drone strikes and surveillance, in accordance with the open-source intelligence initiative Essential Threats.
For the reason that conflict started, the SAF and RSF have used drones spanning from short-range techniques to these with a spread of as much as 4,000km (2,485 miles), able to reaching any goal in Sudan.
Sudan measures 1,250km (775 miles) from north to south and 1,390km (865 miles) from east to west, distances simply coated by RSF drones just like the Chinese language-made Wing Loong II and Turkish Bayraktar TB2.
SAF drones
The Sudanese military’s drones, which it makes use of for reconnaissance and precision assaults, primarily come from Iran, just like the Mohajer-6 fight UAV, which was provided to the SAF in late 2023.
It could carry a multispectral surveillance payload and/or as much as two precision-guided munitions with a most ordnance of as much as 40kg (88lb) and a spread as much as 2,000km (1,243 miles)
The video under, verified by Al Jazeera’s Sanad verification workforce, exhibits RSF drones focusing on the Sidon gasoline depot in Atbara, River Nile State, in April, in accordance with Sudan Warfare Updates.
RSF drones
Despite the fact that the RSF has no air pressure, in accordance with a 2024 Amnesty International report, its allies have armed it with UAVs, together with Chinese language- and Serbian-manufactured drones.
One instance, in accordance with the Reuters news agency, is Chinese language kamikaze drones reportedly utilized in high-profile RSF strikes with a spread of as much as 2,000km (1,243 miles) and a payload of 40kg (88lb). This lengthy attain permits the RSF to strike as far east as Port Sudan from areas it holds within the west.
It is usually deploying heavier FH-95 drones with a 200kg to 250kg (440lb to 550lb) payload that may drop laser-guided bombs. FH-95s have been noticed by humanitarian organisations at Nyala Airport in South Darfur in late 2024.
A video printed in April seems to doc an RSF suicide drone that crashed into a house in al-Dabba in Northern State. The publish mentioned it killed six individuals from one household, together with two kids.
One other weapon within the RSF fleet is a Serbian-made Yugoimport VTOL drone. The four-rotor drone can take off vertically and has reportedly been modified to hold mortar shells as dumb bombs.
What makes these drones vital is their skill to ship artillery-level firepower with no need personnel on the bottom.
The TikTok video under seems to point out RSF fighters utilizing a quadcopter drone, usually made out of industrial elements and able to carrying mortar shells.
These makeshift, light-weight drones with 120mm mortar rounds explode on influence, making them significantly indiscriminate.
Andreas Kreig, affiliate professor on the College of Safety at King’s School London, advised Al Jazeera: “On RSF diversifications, sure, there may be ingenuity, and it’s precisely what you’d anticipate from a decentralised pressure with exterior provide choices.
“The RSF seems keen to weaponise industrial quadcopters, repurpose agricultural or logistics drones, and modify platforms past their unique design.”
The tactical logic is pragmatic: Drones are used to harass, distract and strike targets of symbolic or financial worth, not essentially to ship constantly exact battlefield results.”
“That sort of adaptation thrives in militia buildings as a result of approval chains are shorter and the urge for food for improvisation is larger. It is usually per exterior enabling. The extra a gaggle is plugged right into a transnational assist community, the extra it could experiment with elements, munitions and strategies till one thing works.”
Provide chains: Who’s supplying drones? And the way?
Most drones in Sudan are smuggled in by a community of overseas backers by way of land, sea and air, bypassing official embargoes, as overseas states exploit the state of affairs to their benefit.
The SAF is believed to have drone expertise and navy assist from Egypt, Russia, Iran and Turkiye, utilizing Eritrea as a transit hub to Port Sudan, in accordance with Krieg and Essential Threats, a undertaking established by the American Enterprise Institute to analyse nationwide safety threats globally.
In line with Reuters, the SAF has obtained Iranian drones and elements with Iranian Mohajer-6s reportedly arriving in late 2023 and 2024, usually by way of cargo flights arriving in Port Sudan, which the military has not confirmed. Turkiye has offered Bayraktar drones by way of Egypt, in accordance with Essential Threats.
Critical Threats and the Royal United Services Institute defence suppose tank have discovered that a number of of the overseas actors supplying drones to the SAF, resembling Iran and Russia, have achieved so in change for a regional presence. Iran reportedly hopes to safe a Pink Sea naval base whereas Russia is claimed to have switched from supporting the RSF by way of the Kremlin-funded Wagner Group to supporting the SAF in 2024 in change for reinstating a 2017 settlement for a Pink Sea naval base.
The RSF, however, has reportedly obtained drone expertise and navy assist from the UAE by way of varied transit factors, together with japanese Chad, South Sudan, southeastern Libya, northeastern Somalia and the Central African Republic.
Sudan’s UN ambassador, Al-Harith Idriss al-Harith Mohamed, has repeatedly and publicly accused the UAE on the UN Safety Council of arming the RSF. Whereas Abu Dhabi denies these claims, open-source evaluation has documented dozens of UAE-operated cargo flights flying into japanese Chad since April 2023. In line with Reuters, at the least 86 UAE flights suspected of carrying weapons for the RSF landed at Chad’s Amdjarass airstrip.
“The UAE sits on the hub as a result of it could mix procurement capability, permissive industrial infrastructure, aviation connectivity and a dense layer of intermediaries that may transfer dual-use techniques with no clear state signature,” Krieg mentioned.
“From there, the spokes run by way of jurisdictions that provide cowl, weak oversight or helpful geography.”
Krieg mentioned Amdjarass issues due to its proximity to Darfur and its mixture of humanitarian and industrial visitors that gives cowl.
In line with Reuters, satellite tv for pc photographs confirmed UAE-branded pallets being unloaded close to RSF provide routes. From Chad, arms are trucked into Darfur or by way of areas managed by japanese Libya navy commander Khalifa Haftar. The RSF can be mentioned to function out of Somalia with Bosaso airport, positioned in Somalia’s semiautonomous Puntland area, being developed by the UAE. Nevertheless, the UAE has denied this.
Jap Libya is one other route, drawing on Haftar-aligned networks already skilled in smuggling and convoy safety. Additional afield, hubs like Bosaso and Entebbe, Uganda, are staging factors the place shipments might be damaged down, redocumented and moved onwards in smaller consignments, “preserving believable deniability”, in accordance with Krieg.
“The drones themselves hardly ever must journey as full plane. Essentially the most resilient mannequin is modular transport: airframes, engines, datalinks, optics, batteries, floor management elements and munitions shifting individually beneath industrial cowl.
“While you add the commodity layer, particularly gold, the community turns into self-financing. The identical corridors that transfer drone elements can transfer bullion, money and high-value items again out [of Sudan],” he mentioned.
